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An investigation to re-evaluate the current use in military applications of the ADM-300 Multi-
Functional Survey Instrument and its requirements are provided.  This paper outlines a method to 
upgrade the ADM-300 due to its eventual obsolescence using newly developed requirements that 
meet the original justification for use in the USAF in 1992.  The capabilities and features of 
various detectors are analyzed and compared to the ADM-300.  Response curves are generated 
using Monte Carlo simulations.  The detectors are prioritized based on their performance to 
create metrics.  A metanalysis of the metrics is conducted to limit bias within the process and 
justify their application in various military scenarios.  The Colibri platform is the recommended 
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The ADM-300 Multi-Functional Survey has been in use for nine decades (Southern Scientific 
Ltd., 2021) and, for the past three decades (Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992) has been 
used by the US Air Force (USAF).  Due to advances in technology, the use of the ADM-300 
should be re-evaluated.  The ADM-300 is an electronic ionizing radiation detector.  The base 
unit of the ADM-300 is a Geiger-Muller (GM) gamma-ray detector, which has additional probes 
for the detection of alpha, beta, and neutron radiation.  The ADM-300 has undergone 
incremental updates in an attempt to modernize.  Newer platforms were investigated as 
candidates to replace the ADM-300.  Just as the ADM-300 replaced the AN/PDR-27 and 
AN/PDR-43 using the ANSI N42.17A-1989, the newer platforms will be evaluated against the 
updated standard.  The requirements that justify using the ADM-300 are not simply the explicit 
standards they are tested against but are implicit factors that increase efficiency and effectiveness 
over previous generations.  Investigating the origin of requirements aids in refining existing 
needs.  A process to evaluate newer platforms against developed requirements involves 
comparing literature specifications, Monte Carlo simulations, effectiveness in various situations, 
and hands-on testing.  Some newer platforms considered are the Colibri, Radiagem 2000, 
MULTIRAD-LLR, and RDS-100P platforms.  The newer platforms are compared against the 
ADM-300.  Cost, training, and other logistical concerns will be discussed. 
 
This document outlines a general-purpose rationale for re-evaluating a field tool used in 
radiological emergency responses by the United States military.  The criteria within can be 
altered and adjusted based on the organization’s needs.  All data contained is publicly available.  




information could be included in this document due to the interest of readability, brevity, and 







The ADM-300 replaced the AN/PDR-27 and AN/PDR-43 GM detector for use in service by the 
USAF in 1991 (Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992).  In 1991, the USAF used the ANSI 
N42.17A-1989, Performance Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation-Portable 
Instrumentation for Use in Normal Environmental Conditions (American National Standard 
Performance Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation - Portable Instrumentation for 
Use in Normal Environmental Conditions, 1989) testing protocol and MIL-STD-810D, 
Environmental Test Methods And Engineering Guidelines (MIL-STD-810D, Environmental Test 
Methods and Engineering Guidelines, 1983) standard to ensure adequate testing of the ADM-300 
against the AN/PDR-27 and AN/PDR-43.  In much the same way, the other platforms will be 
tested against the updated ANSI N42.17A-2003 (American National Standard Performance 
Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation-Portable Instrumentation for Use in Normal 
Environmental Conditions, 2004) and MIL-STD-810H (MIL-STD-810H, Environmental 
Engineering Considerations And Laboratory Tests, 2019), which supersede their previous 
guidance.  Currently, the USAF requires the following standards: 
 MIL-HDBK-454B: General Guidelines for Electronic Equipment 
 MIL-HDBK-781A: Reliability Test Methods, Plans, and Environments for Engineering 
Development, Qualification, and Production 
 MIL-STD-130N: Identification Marking of U. S. Military Property 
 MIL-STD-461G: Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference 
Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment 
 MIL-STD-464C: Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems 




 MIL-STD-1686C: Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of Electrical 
and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment (Excluding Electrically Initiated 
Explosive Devices) 
 MIL-STD-2169B: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Environment 
The ANSI N42.17A-2003 standard is more stringent and less ambiguous than ANSI N42.17A-
1989, and it cites NIST for the appropriate reference radiation source.  The radiation testing 
section of ANSI N42.17A-1989 is the focus of this paper since it is the most academically 
rigorous, but considerations for integrated analysis, display, battery life, operating temperatures, 
ruggedness, weight, etc. from the military standards are also considered.    
 
These standards are also referred to as requirements.  Meeting the requirements is sufficient for 
certification but does not address the underlying assumptions for justifying the use of the ADM-
300, such as “off-the-shelf,” expanded capability, and the consolidation of two instruments.  
Formalizing implicit needs into explicit requirements is required to compare their utility.  Their 
utility is derived from their ability to provide information to perform a risk analysis for radiation 






2.1. Exposure Risk 
The scope of the comparison of the ADM-300 in this paper focuses on its ability to provide 
information in radiation emergencies that are of concern to the military in the determination of 
exposure risk.  Exposure risk is the probability weighted with severity.  Severity can be 
characterized by the type of radiological incident, activity (quantity/intensity), duration, and 
radiation type (alpha, beta, gamma, neutron) emitted.   
 
2.2. Types of Radiological Incidents 
Radiation emergencies fall into several categories and can be intentional or unintentional.  The 
type of radiological incident determines how exposure data can be collected.  The performance 
of a radiation detector in the following scenarios represents the benchmark capability of the 
given detector.  The scenarios below are considered representative radiation incidents of concern. 
 Nuclear Emergency: A nuclear emergency involving the detonation of a nuclear weapon 
in a populated area.  These are known as Domestic Nuclear Explosions (DNE).  A type of 
nuclear weapon is an improvised nuclear device (IND).   
 Nuclear Power Plant Accident:  Major releases from a commercial nuclear power plant 
are deviations from the periodic releases of airborne or waterborne radioactivity within 
regulatory limits as part of normal operations.  Spent nuclear fuel release is included in 
this category.  An accident or attack on a power plant could result in the spread of nuclear 
material over a populated area. 
 Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD):  An RDD, also known as a dirty bomb, is a mix of a 
chemical explosive such as dynamite and radioactive powders or pellets such as the beta-




radioactive material over an area.  The radioactive material does not undergo nuclear 
fission or fusion.   
 Alpha Radiation Dispersal Device (α-RDD), Broken Arrow, or Failed Improvised 
Nuclear Device (IND):  An α-RDD contains plutonium.  Broken Arrow is the code name 
of accidents involving a nuclear weapon outside the context of deterrence.  Broken Arrow 
may include IND, but for this scenario, RDD is considered.  An IND that fails to reach 
criticality is a failed IND.  A failed IND behaves much like an RDD.   
 Transportation Accident:  A transportation accident would fall into one of the categories 
above.  Shipments involving significant amounts of radioactive material must have 
signage and documentation for the radioactive package. 
 Assistance to base “Environmental Health Units”:  This scenario involves normal 
radiation protection activities and tends to be more occupational.   
The method section describes the above scenarios in more detail.  The nonexperimental 
validation of a detector is compared to its ability to outperform the ADM-300 in each 
representative scenario. 
 
The activity and radiation type affect the scale of the scenarios.  Incidents have varying 
durations, but it can be assumed large-scale incidents have long durations of exposure.  Activity 
and radiation type are intrinsically linked.  An aliquot of a specific isotope always yields the 
same activity and radiation type with all else constant.  Radiation types determine the absorbed 
dose, which can determine the effective dose if a person is exposed.  Minimizing exposure 





Radiation sources of interest are radioisotopes or progeny with significant half-lives and a 
relatively high specific activity.   If the sum of half-lives of the isotope and progeny are less than 
ten days (Definitions, 10 CFR § 71.4 , 2017), then the isotope stabilizes too quickly to affect a 
target.  Isotopes with low specific activity are dilute enough to be classified as 10–4 A2/g for 
solids and gases and 10–5 A2/g for liquids where A2 is defined by 49 CFR § 173.4352.  Generally, 
isotopes with high specific activity and long half-lives are easily transported and remain viable to 
induce acute radiation exposure on a target.   
These radiation sources have typically undergone refinement and not naturally occurring.  
Natural background radiation, such as cosmic and terrestrial radiation, do not produce 
radioactive material in sufficient concentrations to be weaponized.  Gamma radiation detectors 
will pick up background radiation and should be accounted for when searching for radiation 
sources.   
 
Radioisotopes of particular interest are industrial and medical sources where the specific activity 
and half-lives can be significant.    Industrial and medical radiation sources have many legitimate 
uses, but it important to understand when an individual source is out of place.  “Some examples 
include (i) nuclear well logging in the oil industry to determine if oil-producing rock formations 
are present; (ii) sterilization of medical supplies and food; (iii) production of luminous watch 
dials and signs; (iv) radiography of metal parts and welds in manufacturing and construction; (v) 
thickness monitoring on production lines of sheet metals and foils; (vi) monitoring the structural 
integrity of roads, buildings, and bridges; and (vii) the manufacture of smoke detectors.”3.   
Medical sources used in diagnostic imaging such as 99mTc, 131I and 201Tl initially have an intense 




of being allowed to decay away.  In either case, it may seem radioactive material is being 
transported but is rather the result of a medical procedure.   Industrial and medical sources of 
interest are 3H, 14C, 60Co, 82Br, 85Kr, 90Sr, 99Mo, 131I, 133Xe, 137Cs, 144Ce, 147Pm, 170Tm, 192Ir, 
201Tl, 241Am, 252Cf, 241Am, and 239Pu.  For some of these isotopes, the progeny may be longer-
lived than the parent or emit a different type of radiation.  Table 1 below classifies the type of 
radiation emitted by each isotope.  The table is not an exhaustive list of every possible 
radionuclide but a representative sample of likely possibilities. 
 
 




Alpha 239Pu, 241Am 
Beta 
3H, 14C, 60Co, 82Br, 85Kr, 90Sr, 99Mo, 131I, 133Xe, 137Cs, 144Ce, 147Pm, 
170Tm, 192Ir, 201Tl 
Gamma 
60Co, 82Br, 85Kr, 99Mo, 131I, 133Xe, 137Cs, 144Ce, 147Pm, 170Tm, 192Ir, 




When certain isotopes with an atomic number of 90 or greater such as 235U, 241Pu, and 252Cf, are 
bombarded with thermal neutrons, they can undergo fissile reactions and emit neutrons.  With 
enough concentration or moderation, the process can be self-sustaining. 
 
The type of radiation emitted determines the type of detector needed to identify or quantity the 
activity.  Alpha particles do not travel far and cannot penetrate the outer layer of human skin.  




eyes.  They are both an internal health concern if inhaled, ingested, or enter through a wound; 
however, instruments designed to locate sources cannot measure an internal dose.  Neutron and 
photon radiations travel much farther in the air and can penetrate the skin.  Because of this, they 
can be a health risk at a distance from a radioactive source.   
 
2.3. DoD Response 
DoD organizations provide support during the nuclear and radiological scenarios described 
above.  Typically, this occurs when the relevant civil authorities have requested DoD assistance 
because response operation requirements for federal, state, tribal, and local entities have been 
expended or will exceed their capabilities.  Support can be provided to deter, prevent, protect, or 
recover from potential or actual incidents (DOE, 2010).  If imminent harm to people, property, or 
the environment is avoidable, the DoD can quickly respond to incidents until local authorities are 
able to respond.   
 
At times DoD responsibility to respond domestically may overlap with the Dept of Energy 
(DoE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
United States Coast Guard (USCG), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Dept of Homeland Security (DHS).  The coordinating 
agency will primarily be the responsible authority.  The DoD has varying levels of capabilities 







Probability is linked to the frequency of past events and indicators of vulnerabilities.  
Preparedness is largely based on past events.  Recent incidents contribute to an increased 
likelihood of a future incident until the root cause is mitigated; therefore, recentness contributes 
to an increase in probability.  If an incident occurred more than once, then its contribution to the 
increased probability is compounded.  This stems from an indicator that has not been identified 
or mitigated.  Examples of indicators are negligence, lack of training or regulation, degraded 
hardware, and other deficiencies.  Each of the past events falls into a scenario discussed.   
 
Individual disasters, incidents, and sites: 
 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster 
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was the most recent nuclear and most severe nuclear 
accident since the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown.  A tsunami struck the nuclear power plant and 
disabled the cooling to the reactors resulting in the meltdown of 3 reactors.  The meltdown 
initiated multiple hydrogen explosions, released radioactive contamination in the air and water.  
Radioactive cesium-137 from the incident is still detectable in the ocean today.     
 
 2001 Instituto Oncologico Nacional radiotherapy accident 
The Instituto Oncologico Nacional (National Oncological Institute) in Panama City, Panama, 
overexposed patients to lethal doses of radiation from a linear accelerator.  The shielding blocks 
used to protect patients were improperly calculated when entered into the treatment planning 
system.  The treatment planning system assumed more shielding and calculated an exposure time 
to compensate.  The longer exposure time resulted in a much larger dose.  Twenty-eight patients 




data entry.  The newly calculated dose was not verified using a water phantom or any other 
testing procedure before human use.  The accidental exposure was determined to be due to 
negligence, and as of this time, the oncology staff is being sued (International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 2001).    
 
 1987 Goiânia accident 
A radiotherapy source was stolen from an abandoned hospital in Goiânia, Brazil.  The 93 grams 
of 137Cs source was removed from its shielded enclosure and subsequently handled and divided 
to over 249 people and contaminated approximately 112k people.  The total activity at the time 
was estimated to be 51 TBq.  The thief experienced prodromal radiation sickness upon taking the 
source home.  Not knowing the cause of his illness, the thief continued to explore and share the 
source due to its deep blue color.  Friends and family were given pieces of the source.  Five 
individuals suffered acute radiation poisoning and died (International Atomic Energy Agency, 
1988).  
 
 1986 Chernobyl disaster 
The most famous and most severe nuclear disaster was the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant in current day Pryp’yat’, Ukraine.  An exercise at the plant to test the delay between 
electric and backup power to the cooling system initiated a sequence of events that caused the 
reactor to overheat.  The superheated water ignited and caused a catastrophic explosion.   A 16-
kilometer radius was contaminated with radioactive material, and an exclusion zone of 30 





 1959 SRE partial nuclear meltdown at Santa Susana Field Laboratory 
The sodium reactor experiment (SRE) at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, CA, experienced a 
partial meltdown for two months.  The SRE was the first of its kind, with many procedures based 
on theoretical limits and cladding materials with little operational experience.  The reactor’s 
primary coolant was liquid sodium, but tetralin contaminated the coolant, causing sodium to be 
trapped in the fuel rod.  13 of the 43 fuel rods overheated and melted (Ashley, et al., 1961).  The 
release of radioactivity occurred gradually and within regulatory limits.  The SRE was 
decommissioned in 1964 (Carroll, Conners, Harris, Marzec, & Ureda, 1983).    
 
 1958 Mailuu-Suu tailings dam failure 
The dam holding back 600k cubic meters of uranium tailings failed due to neglect and erosion in 
Mailuu-Suu, Kyrgyzstan.  Uranium tailings were a byproduct of uranium mining left behind.  No 
attempt was made to seal or stabilize the material after uranium mining was abandoned.  The 
uranium tailings flowed into the Mailuu-Suu River and spread 40 kilometers into Uzbekistan 
(Birsen & Kadyrzhanov, 2012).   
 
 1957 Kyshtym disaster 
The Kyshtym disaster was an accidental explosion of ammonium nitrate at a plutonium 
production plant for nuclear weapons in Ozyorsk, Russia.  The explosion dispersed uranium and 
plutonium over an area of 20k sq kilometers.  Within a few days, 300 of the 5000 residents of 
Ozyorsk died of radiation poisoning.  Many details are unknown due to censorship (Webb, 





 1957 Windscale fire 
The Windscale fire was a fire of a cartridge of a graphite-moderated reactor at the Windscale 
nuclear power plant in Seascale, Great Britain.  The fire released radioactive isotopes in the 
atmosphere of Iodine-131, Cesium-137, Xenon-133, Xenon-135, and Strontium-90 over the UK 
and the rest of Europe.  The long-term health effects are unknown mainly due to censorship but 
are suspected of being responsible for 240 deaths related to cancer and affected 500 square 
kilometers of the countryside (Highfield, 2007).   
 
 1954 Totskoye nuclear exercise 
The Totskoye nuclear exercise was a Russian military exercise involving a 40-kiloton atomic 
bomb detonation.  The bomb was detonated at the Totskoye range, 15 kilometers from the rural 
town of Totskoye in Russia.  45k Soviet military members were ordered to collect data from the 
fallout of the epicenter but not to exceed 1 R/h on their detectors.  Training and safety 
procedures, PPE, and decontamination procedures were not followed strictly (Markov, 2012).   
 
 1950 Desert Rock exercises 
The Desert Rock exercises were a series of 8 military exercising involving several nuclear bomb 
detonations.  Nuclear device yields ranged from zero to 44 kilotons.  The tests were conducted 
over seven years at the Nevada Proving Grounds.  20k – 68k DoD personnel witnessed these 
events from 11 kilometers away, excluding airdrop personnel.  Personnel were trained in 
radiation safety procedures, wore dosimeters, used PPE, decontaminated after leaving controlled 
areas.  Average exposure was normally distributed around 0.1-0.4 rem, with the highest exposure 




approximately 11k DoD members for their reaction to witnessing a nuclear detonation (Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency, 2015).   
 
2.5. ADM-300 Consolidation 
The risks determine the constraints for preparedness.  From a military perspective, radiation 
assessment teams should be equipped with detectors to handle each scenario.  The USAF, until 
1992, used four different detectors to detect three types of radiation, but this drove the need for a 
quality multifunction portable RADIAC instrument.  In table 2 are the four instruments the 
USAF used, and the device that replaced them was the ADM-300. 
 
 
Table 2: Various Radiation Instruments and their Operational Capabilities 




In the greater context of a radiation detection suite in table 3, the ADM-300 provides an in-situ 
dose measurement for an alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation at close distances; however, 
it cannot identify unknown isotopes.  The ADM-300 effectively reduces the required number of 




Table 3: Radiation Equipment for Occupational and Environmental Health 
Item Sample Type Target 
RADēCO Grab Sampler Alpha, Beta Collect particles 
ADM-300 
Alpha, Beta, Gamma, X-
ray 
Radiation 
Electronic Personnel Dosimeter (EPD) Gamma 
Personal Radiation 
Dose 
GR 135 Radioisotope Identifier Gamma Isotope identification 
SAM 940 Radiation Isotope Identifier Gamma Isotope identification 
Victoreen 451P Gamma Radiation 







2.6. ADM-300 Shortfalls  
During validation and testing, the ADM-300 did not meet the criteria of ANSI N42.17A-1989 in 
a few areas.  The findings are summarized below: 
 The alarm activation delay exceeds ten mrem for fields greater than 1.3 R/hr.  
Furthermore, the display lags behind the audio alarm.  This delay is due to a built-in time 
lag to update the display every 2 seconds.  Assuming the alarm activation delay is fixed 
between each successive delivered radiation exposure, an exposure rate greater than 1.3 
R/hr will result in exposure to the individual of more than ten mrem (Armstrong, Hoak, 
Nixon, & Martin, 1992). 
 The angular dependence of the ADM-300 is dependent upon the orientation of the 
electronics in the package through which the radiation must travel to get to the detector.  
Because the detector is mounted in the unit, it did not pass the angular dependence 
requirements of ANSI N42.17A for all axes of rotation.  The ADM-300 unit with the beta 
window on the bottom has less angular dependence than the unit with the beta window 




 Since the instrument is a digital instrument, the response time should be instantaneous.  
The manufacturer’s literature indicates the response time is 2 seconds in a field above 1 
R/hr and below 5 seconds in a field less than 1 R/hr.  The ADM-300 updates the display 
approximately every 2 seconds, regardless of the radiation field that is being measured 
(Armstrong, Hoak, Nixon, & Martin, 1992). 
 The GM-tubes under responds from 1 µR/hr to 2000 R/hr. by 5% and over responds 
above 8000 R/hr. by 27%. 
 The GM-tubes under responds at 140 keV and over responds at 120 keV. 
Due to its age, the ADM-300 is no longer supported by its last manufacturer and has reached 
end-of-life.  Therefore, when parts fail, they cannot be replaced or repaired by the manufacturer, 
and readings taken by the detector may potentially be inaccurate and may not stand up to legal 
scrutiny.        
 
2.7. Past Needs Assessment  
The next generation detector’s needs should build upon the needs of the original detector so that 
the performance of the ADM-300 is the minimum standard.  This also provides an opportunity to 
re-evaluate the original needs to see if they still meet today’s needs.  The original needs of the 
ADM-300 in summary are: 
 The detector is “off-the-shelf.”  “Off-the-shelf” in this context means the product is 
already commercially available and was not custom-designed for the client.  Off-the-shelf 
components cater to many clients enabling economies of scale, which defers the cost of 




to multiple readiness teams worldwide, the devices tend to have fewer proprietary parts, 
and are more easily repaired. 
 The ability to detect alpha, beta, high and low range gamma, and neutron radiation.  
Essentially, the ADM-300 detects the four major radiation particles.      
 Consolidation of multiple instruments.  The ADM-300 consolidated the functions of four 
different detectors.  A successor should ideally reduce the number of detectors as part of 
a deployment package to perform a full-spectrum analysis.  At the very least, the detector 
should encompass the features of the ADM-300 and four detectors it replaced.   
 The ADM-300 went through the appropriate certifications in 1992: ANSI N42.17A-1989 
and MIL-STD-810D.  Since then, the standards have been updated and appended, as 
stated in section 2.  Each candidate must be tested using the new standards.  The 
requirements are listed in ANSI N42.17A-2003 and are summarized as follows: 
 The ratio of the mean indicated value to the conventionally true value shall fall within 
the range 0.90 to 1.10. 
 For probes, the surface sensitivity shall be expressed in counts per unit time or 
activity per unit squared.  Activity is quoted in Curie, Becquerel, and/or dpm. 
 Quote 2π activities (surface emission rates) for alpha and beta sources and 4π 
(absolute activities) for an alpha, beta, and gamma sources.  
 Consider the backscatter and self-absorption effects of the source and surface to be 
monitored when the efficiency is determined using a source’s 4π emission rate.  
 Calculate activity-based alarm set points by dividing the efficiency by 2.   
 The photon energy range must be at least between 80 keV and 1.25 MeV and within 




 The beta energy range must be at least between 0.2 MeV to 3.5 MeV and within 50% 
of the reference energy.   
 The neutron energy range must be stated and within -50% and +100% of the 
reference energy.   
 The mean response of an instrument to a photon radiation incident at any angle not 
exceeding 45º from the direction of maximum response of the instrument shall be not 
less than 80% of this maximum response.  At an angle of 90º from the direction of 
maximum response, the mean instrument reading shall be not less than 50% of the 
maximum response.  These requirements apply for at least two representative photon 
energies. 
MIL-STD-810H provides a good source of a variety of environmental conditions a typical 
detector should be able to function.  In the MIL-STD’s, the assumptions of any device ought to 
perform are explicitly written as compliance items to prevent the use of shoddy instruments 
obtained from poorly written contracts.  In the case where MIL-STD’s are overly esoteric, then 
the need for off-the-shelf should take priority. For example, the performance of a detector in the 
presence of weapon fire is not typically a concern of a commercially available detector.  Off-the-
shelf in-situ detectors are typically designed to work in a wide range of climates and are designed 
to handle the expected roughness during transport and operation.  The design of commercially 
available off-the-shelf detectors surpasses the minimum standards set in the MIL-STD’s in many 
respects.  However, adherence to MIL-STD’s cannot be guaranteed with off-the-shelf devices.  
The needs of the military benefit with an overlap of the needs of emergency responders 
nationwide.  Emergency responders utilize an All-Hazards Approach, in which detection 




designed primarily for emergency responders will simultaneously meet most of the needs of the 
military.   
 
2.8. Current Needs Assessment  
A successor to the ADM-300 needs to leverage technology to remain relevant.  Computers are 
easily accessible and portable. Recording and recording data should not be a manual process.  
The ADM-300 displays readings on an LCD screen for the last measurement performed.  The 
memory is cleared with each measurement.  A serial cable can be connected to the ADM-300, 
providing a string of data per 2 seconds containing dose rate, accumulated dose, unfiltered dose, 
mode, alarm, and audio chirp (Hansen, 2010).  Fig 1 shows an example of a typical setup: 
 
 









Fig. 1  demonstrates a need for a less cumbersome method of analyzing data in-situ and 
illustrates a basic minimum data analysis method.  Therefore, a need is wireless data 
communication to a computer, regardless if the detector has built-in software that analyzes the 
data.  The assumption is that the data transmitted is open-source or in a nonproprietary format.  
Once the manufacturer no longer supports the device, the software can be supported self-
sufficiently.  Data aggregation is a powerful tool in developing a site picture.  The aggregation of 
data from multiple devices can be done over a network.  The job of a health physicist can be 
parallelized if multiple detectors are deployed and are collecting data simultaneously to a server.  














Lastly, the general characteristics of any good detector are desired.  These fall into six main 
categories: absoluteness, precision and accuracy, dose range, dose-rate range, stability, and 
energy dependence (Attix, 1986). 
The absoluteness of a detector is its ability to be used as a primary measurement device, thus not 
requiring calibration.  Most detectors are secondary measurement devices requiring calibration 
with a standard or a primary measurement device.  The advantage of absoluteness is the detector 




and tasks.  Absoluteness is independent of precision and accuracy, but an absolute detector must 
be reasonably accurate and precise.     
Precision is the detector’s ability to handle random errors due to ambient conditions.  The 
standard deviation is inversely proportional to precision.  Accuracy is the proximity of the 
expected value to the actual value of the quantity measured.  Although accuracy is independent 
of precision, both reasonable accuracy and precision are required for a viable detector.    
The dose range must be sensitive throughout the entire range to be measured.  The response can 
be linear, but if it is non-linear, the dose-response curve must have a known function.  Ideally, 
the lower limit of the range should be zero, which should account for instrumental background 
noise.  The dose range at a minimum should be able to detect natural background radiation, 
which is on average about 0.3 mrem in the US (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2020), and 
double background with reproducibility and minimal time delay.   When the detector reaches or 
exceeds the range’s upper limit, the reading should not revert to zero.  For GM detectors, 
deadtime can contribute to a zero reading.  This is poor design and places the user in danger.  
Internal circuitry should interpolate readings during deadtime.  Internal circuitry should at 
minimum interpolate readings during deadtime. 
The response time constant should be short for an ideal dose rate response.  The response time 
constant is defined as when it takes the reading to reach 1/e of its steady-state for the constant 
field.   As mentioned previously, the reading during deadtime should not be zero.   
The stability of a detector is related to its ability to be able to detect consistently over the life of 
the device.  Use, temperature, atmospheric conditions, humidity, etc. should not cause a change 
in the dose sensitivity before irradiation.  After each irradiation, the detector should be able to 




The energy dependence of a detector is the dependence of its reading per unit quantum or kinetic 
energy of the radiation.  As the energy of the radiation changes, the reading of the detector may 
have an independent or dependent response.    








The methodology section consists of selecting the combined instrumentation needs and selecting 
prospective instruments.  An explanation of the requirements and scenarios is below.  Each 
instrumentation platform is briefly described, evaluated on the requirements and scenarios.  The 
scenarios are used to calibrate the weighting in the comparison of detectors.  The weightings 
scale the importance of each requirement, but a function can be used instead.  The ADM-300 is 
evaluated first as a baseline reference and subsequently the candidate detectors.  The ADM-300 
is used as a reference to compare candidates for its replacement.  The detectors that score well in 
this section are evaluated experimentally in the next section.  
 
3.1. Combined Instrument Needs 
The methods of detection are limited to in situ, real-time and portable instruments.  Specifically, 
localized handheld exposure rate survey instruments are included in this study.  Ion chambers, 
GM tubes, scintillators, semiconductors, or other types of detectors are considered.  Every 
radiation type that may affect tissue is considered, such as alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron 
radiation.  Detection equipment can be used to perform contamination surveys of people, 
property, or the environment (ground deposition), but stationary detectors such as portal 
detectors are not considered, whereas handheld detectors that can operate in a portal 
configuration are considered.  Isotropic identification, such as gamma spectroscopy, while 
important, is not the focus of the study.  Large-scale monitoring via airborne or vehicle-borne 
surveys is not the focus of this study.  Air sampling, passive sampling, or laboratory analysis of 





3.2. Prospective Instruments 
The detectors chosen for evaluation can fulfill a similar role as the ADM-300.  The detectors 
below are not inclusive of all instruments in this category but serve an example of a process to 
determine a successor.  Any detector may be compared, but detectors that fit the scope of this 
study can effectively provide data to make an accurate field assessment will likely score better.  




Each need can be viewed as a requirement.  The requirements can be considered to be meeting a 
minimum value or simply as a feature or a relative ranking of detectors for the requirement.  The 
requirements are arranged into four tables: Instrument Limits and Specifications, Intrinsic 
Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical.   
 
Each table is scored in its respective section with an assigned utility.  Utilities can be arbitrary 
since they will be scaled appropriately after weighting.  For all cases, a higher utility is more 
desirable.  The scores are combined into a matrix and compared.  Features that are present or 
absent will be represented with a 0 or 1, with 1 indicating a desirable feature is available.  If a 
numerical value already exists for a specification, then it will be used instead of a ranking 
system. For example, a battery life of 5 hours will be represented as 5 to preserve the relative 
proportions between detectors.  Given a battery life of 5 hours and 100 hours, a ranking system 
would not preserve the 20x effect of 100-hour battery life over 5-hour battery life.  An item’s 




2-kg object will have a utility of 1/2.  For intangible requirements such as user interface ease of 
use, a ranking system from 1 to 10 will be utilized.  The ADM-300 serves as the baseline of the 
ranking system, and its value will be five, which allows the other five candidates to be higher or 
lower in rank to the ADM-300, but detectors may have the same rank if they are equivalent.  
Probes in a platform are scored, averaged, and added to the parent device’s utility if a 
requirement does not explicitly apply to the probe. Note that attributes are normalized to one 
prior to applying weights. 
 
3.4. Instrument Limits and Specifications 
Alarm – An audio and/or visual alarm signifies an exceedance of a predetermined exposure until 
reset.  Alarms may vary in sound or appearance to signify different information, such as the 
exceedance of an exposure rate versus the total dose.  Alarms should also indicate the failure of 
any core components.  Alarms vary in complexity, from monotone beeps or flashes to descriptive 
text.  The utility assigned is a Boolean: either it has an alarm or not.   
 
Battery indicator – The battery indicator may be a gauge, dial, or an alarm when low.   The 
utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Battery life – Battery life is the operating time of the detector measured in hours.  The total life 
or number of recharges of a rechargeable battery is not considered.  The utility assigned is 1 per 





Dimensions – the height, length, and width of the instrument enclosure are given in centimeters.  
A smaller device lends to a more portable and easier-to-carry device.  The utility assigned is the 
inverse of the volume: 1/V.  The lengths of cords, straps, and cables are not considered.   
 
Humidity – The ability of the detector to operate in humid conditions is measured in percent 
humidity.  The utility assigned is the absolute value of the range.  For example, a detector that 
can operate between 0-95% humidity is assigned a score of 95.   
 
Interference – Detectors may experience fluctuations in readings due to external electromagnetic 
fields, which include nonionizing radiation from radio, microwave, and cellular.   The criteria 
used to determine electromagnetic interference limits are outlined in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or 
MIL-STD-810.  A device is then given a pass or fail; therefore, the utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Interference – Detectors that excel in the detection of ionizing radiation of a single particle type 
may exhibit sensitivities when exposed to another.  For example, a dedicated alpha detector may 
be sensitive to beta radiation.  The criteria used to determine the limits of ionizing radiation 
interference are outlined in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-810.  The device is then given a 
pass or fail; therefore, the utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Ingress Protection - Ingress protection ratings refer to the level of protection of an electrical 
enclosure from solids and liquids.  IP ratings are governed by International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) standard 60529 and are optional certification.  The first digit following IP 




against the instrusion of water.  For enclosed devices, the relevant digit is the second since 
watertight objects tend to be protected against dust.  The utility assigned is the second digit of the 
IP rating; for example, a rating of IP68 or IPX8 is assigned a utility of 8. 
 
Mechanical: shock and vibration – Detectors may experience fluctuations in readings due to 
vibration or other sudden changes in acceleration.  Due to the handheld nature of the devices, 
mechanical shock and vibration are inevitable.  The criteria used to determine the limits of 
mechanical shock and vibration are outlined in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-810.  The 
device is then given a pass or fail; therefore, the utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Power – This requirement indicates the type of power used by the detector, such as AA batteries 
or 220 A/C.  The utility assigned for detectors that do not have a portable power source is 0.  
Non-replaceable rechargeable batteries are assigned a utility of 1.  Proprietary replaceable 
batteries are given a utility of 2.  Replaceable nonproprietary batteries are given a utility of 3. 
 
Power-on self-test (POST) – The power-on self-test is routine conducted by the device when 
turned on that ensures embedded systems are operating.  A failure of any core component will 
prompt an alarm.  The utility assigned is a Boolean.   
 
Pressure – The detector’s ability to handle rapid compression and decompression and low-
pressure extremes are tested.  Pressure greater than sea level is not tested, but pressure up to 




810.  Deviation in readings by more than 15% result in a failure.  The device is then given a pass 
or fail, therefore the utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Readout – The readout is simply the presence of a real-time feedback mechanism in response to 
ionizing radiation.  For example, a thermoluminescent device, does not have a readout and 
requires submission to a lab for dose calculation, whereas an ADM-300 has an LCD screen that 
can display in real-time the measured dose.  The utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Temperature: range – The operating temperature limits are given.  The operating minimum and 
maximum temperature limits given are between is -30 C and 50 C.  Temperatures outside this 
range are not tested even in storage conditions.   The utility assigned is the absolute value of the 
range.  For example, detector that can operate between -5 C and 35 C is assigned a score of 40.   
 
Temperature: shock  – The detector’s ability to handle rapid temperature rise and decline are 
tested.  The temperature did not exceed the temperature range above.  The testing protocols are 
listed in ANSI N42.17A-2003 or MIL-STD-810.  Deviation in readings by more than 15% result 
in a failure.  The device is then given a pass or fail, therefore the utility assigned is a Boolean. 
 
Units (SI, CGS, MKS) – The centimeter-gram-second (CGS) meter-kilogram-second (MKS) 
systems predate the International System (SI), or metric systems of radiation units.  The CGS 
and MKS systems use units such as curie, rad, and rem.  SI units are based on the fundamental 




such as becquerel, gray, and sievert.  SI is the standard and preferred system and is scored with a 
value of 1, and all other systems are assigned zero. 
 
Weight – The weight of the detector is measured in kilograms.  Much like volume, a lighter 
device lends to a more portable and easier-to-carry device.  The utility assigned is the inverse of 
the mass: 1/M.  The weights of accessories not dependent on the direct operation of the device 
are not included, such as straps, cases, and covers.  The weight of cables that connect probes are 
included in the weight of the probe.     
   
3.5. Intrinsic Characteristics 
Accuracy – Accuracy is the mean accuracy of the measured values over the calibration known 
values.  If the closer the ratio is to 1, then the reading is more accurate.  An accuracy of 1 is 
given a utility of 10.  Every 1% away from unity decreases the utility by 1.  Accuracy of more 
than 10% off is assigned zero since the device no longer adheres to ANSI 42.17A section 7.1. 
For example, an accuracy of 1.055 or 0.955 is given a utility of 5.5.   
 
Efficiency (4π): Efficiency is reported for the 4π geometry.  Efficiency is a percentage from 0-
100%.  The assigned utility is the percent from 0-100. 
  
Energy Response: alpha, beta, gamma, neutron – Energy response, also known as energy 
dependence, is the magnitude of the detector response relative to constant radiation energy.  




publish the entire energy response range.  The utility assigned is the difference of the log range 
stated.   
 
Energy Resolution – The measure of how precisely the detector can distinguish two adjacent 
energies of radiation.  The utility assigned is an inverse relationship of one over the stated 
percentage (1/%).  This does not apply to Geiger-Mueller detectors. 
 
Dose Rate Range: alpha, beta, gamma, neutron - The dose rate range is the maximum detectable 
reading minus the lowest detectable reading.  The utility assigned to the dose range is calculated 
as the log(max)- log(min).   
 
Response Time – Response time is measure in seconds for the detector to reach a stable reading 
within 90% of the ambient radiation field.  Response time takes into account the RC time 
constant and the refresh rate of the internal electronics.  The mode is assumed to be set to fast for 
detectors that offer fast, medium, and slow modes.  A faster response time is desired, so the 
utility assigned is the inverse of the time elapsed: 1/T. 
 
Sensitivity - Sensitivity is a measure of how efficiently radiation is converted into a useable 
signal or counts.  Emission rates are typically reported in terms of _/sec or _/sec.  Activity is 
quoted in Curie, Becquerel, or dpm.  Sensitivity may refer to minimum detectable activity 
(MDA) or lower limit of detection (LLD), but not sensitivity from cross-interference.  The utility 






Start-up Time – Start-up time is the time from which the device, from a period of rest, is initially 
turned on to the time a measurement can be taken.  The stability or accuracy of the measurement 
is not a factor, as this is taken into account for response time.  A faster start-up time is desired, so 
the utility assigned is the inverse of the time elapsed: 1/T. 
 
3.6. Smart Features  
Connectivity: Bluetooth, Cellular, Print, RF/Other, Satellite, WIFI, Wired – The presence of a 
connectivity feature is assigned a utility of 1.  If the feature can support telemetry, then it is given 
a utility of 2.  
 
Data Analysis: conversion, dose-limits, error, integrate, isotope ID, expert/advanced mode – The 
presence of a data analysis feature is assigned a utility of 1.   
 
GPS – The device can append measurement data with coordinates in real-time.  It can connect to 
or includes a GPS or another sensor capable of providing accurate coordinates.  The presence or 
absence of this feature is assigned a Boolean. 
 
Graphical User Interface – The graphical user interface of the software is subjective.  An 
intuitive layout and input schema are preferred.  A scale of 0 to 5 is used, with 0 indicating no 





Internal Clock: date & time – The device must have the ability to append measurement data with 
a timestamp.  The presence or absence of this feature is assigned a Boolean.   
 
Internal Memory – The presence of available memory capacity of the device to store 
measurement data.  Data is typically measured in bytes.  The presence of internal memory 
indicates the ability to store readings in some meaningful way, and the exact amount of memory 
is generally not a concern.  If data output is significant, the ability to use removable memory 
would be necessary.   The presence or absence of this feature is assigned a Boolean. 
   
Removable Flash Memory – The presence of a port to insert nonproprietary flash memory to 
back up or record measurements is assigned a utility of 1.  If the device lacks a port for flash 
memory, it is given a 0.   
 
Screen: Black/Color/none – This attribute is assigned a utility of 0 if there is no real-time visual 
indicator of elevated exposure.  Film badge dosimeters lack a real-time or visual indicator of 
elevated exposure.  If the detector has an analog dial or a monochrome LCD screen, it is 
assigned a utility of 1.  The presence of a color screen consists of an array of individually 
addressable color pixels by the detector’s software to display various information.  The utility of 
a color screen is assigned a 2.  
 
3.7. Logistical 
Calibration – The minimum periodicity of calibration within a year traceable to a national 




device requiring weekly calibration is 52.  The utility of calibrations is given an inverse of 1/x.  
This assumes the detector is used once per week.   
   
Consolidation Factor – The number of the types of radiation that are detected by a single device 
or the number of devices made obsolete by the device. 
 
Consumables Required – The device requires consumables to operate.  This includes check 
sources, batteries, gases, filters, etc.  The utility assigned is an inverse utility since requiring 
consumables is not preferred.  If one or no consumables are needed, then the utility is given a 1.   
 
Decontamination Method – If the device can be decontaminated with water without the 
replacement of any significant parts, then it is assigned a utility of 1.  If water decontamination is 
not possible, it is given zero utility. 
 
Durability – The criteria for durability are measured on a pass/fail.  The device undergoes a 
stress test for vibrations, temperature, altitude, humidity, etc., and if any failure occurs, it is 
assigned a utility of zero; otherwise, it is 1.   
 
Ease of Use – Ease of use is subjective.  Ease of use is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 
indicating the preferred experience.   
  
End of Life – The projected end-of-life of a product is the date the manufacturer no longer 




end-of-life product minus the current year.  If the device has already reached end-of-life, then the 
utility assigned is zero.   
 
Initial Cost – The initial cost is the purchase price of the device for initial use.  The quote for one 
detector with a connected alpha probe was used as a representative cost.  A purchase order of one 
resolves the issue of the variable pricing of bulk orders.  Adding the price of a probe normalizes 
the base unit’s cost and considers the need for additional probes.  The utility assigned is an 
inverse utility of 1/$. 
 
Maintenance Cost – The maintenance cost is the cost incurred to keep the device working in 
good condition per year, including the price to calibrate the instrument, clean, or service.  The 
maintenance cost should conservatively be 3% of the asset value.  The utility assigned is an 
inverse utility of 1/$. 
 
Serviceability – Serviceability is the device’s ability to be maintained or repaired by the user.  If 
the device is user-serviceable, then the utility assigned is one; otherwise, it is zero.   
 
Shelf Life – Shelf life is measure in days the detector can remain in good working order before 
expiring or needing to be replaced.  The utility assigned is measured in years from 1 to 5.  
 
Tamper Resistance – The device’s ability to hinder or detect an effect to induce a false positive 
or negative reading.  Tamper resistance instills confidence in measurement integrity.  Tamper 




detect if the instrument were tampered with during normal use.  The utility is the number of 
tamper-resistant features implemented on a device.        
 
Training Cost – Training cost is the cost to educate the users on how to operate the device.  The 
cost is averaged per user for the first year.  The utility assigned is an inverse utility of 1/$.  This 
figure does not include the hourly rate of the user.  The training cost is often constant for devices 
from the same manufacturer.   
 
Training Time - Training time is the time needed to educate the users on how to operate the 
device.  The time is measured in hours per user for the first year.  The utility assigned is an 
inverse utility of 1/h. The training time is often constant for devices from the same manufacturer.   
 
Transportability – Transportability in this context is defined by the device’s ability to be carried 
by either hand, non-motorized vehicle, or motorized vehicle.  A utility of 3 is assigned for 
handheld devices, 2 for requiring a non-motorized vehicle, and 1 for requiring a motorized 
vehicle.   
 
3.8. Scenarios 
The representative scenarios listed previously provide a way to weigh the requirements based on 
the detector performance.  After compiling all the utility values from the different detector types, 
each detector is placed in the following scenarios.  The degree of capability of each detector is 
compared against each scenario’s needs.  After ranking each detector, the weights are adjusted to 





3.8.1. Domestic Nuclear Explosions (DNE) 
The first type is a domestic nuclear explosion (DNE), which involved the detonation of a nuclear 
weapon in a populated area.  Even a small yield atomic detonation is the worst-case scenario due 
to the extreme release of energy in a short time.  In a nuclear explosion, mass is converted to 
energy in an instant.  Approximately less than half of the energy creates the blast itself, and less 
than that is converted to heat, and the rest is ionizing radiation.  Anything within 1.5 miles of the 
center of the explosion is disintegrated.  The objects within this radius, including the earth, are 
irradiated and spread out over hundreds of miles.   
 
Performing lifesaving measures takes priority over measuring for exposures for those already 
exposed.  For emergency responders coming from outside the city, limiting their distance to the 
hypocenter is a priority.  Emergency responders will not sacrifice their life for an individual who 
is already in the lethal radiation zone.  Doing so would kill both; however, the emergency limits 
for personal exposures (ERPGs) would temporarily be suspended, and stay times would be 
developed to prevent the further loss of life.  Measurements required would include dose rate 
exposure from handheld instruments.  Aerial surveys would be conducted to establish an initial 
cordon.  Radiation teams would use this data to create new radiation exposure limits for 
emergency responders and the public.  Aerial surveys, in addition to pre-dispersal aerial surveys, 
would include air sampling due to atmospheric dispersion.  A nuclear detonation releases 
fissionable material into the atmosphere.  Radiation teams will determine a respiratory protection 
factor needed to protect against alpha inhalation.  A ZnS scintillation counter can be used to 




decontamination sweeps of those exiting cordoned areas.  Cordon areas potentially will be in 
place for the long-term, and stationary portal monitors may be set up.  Downwind crops, water, 
livestock will be highly contaminated.  Scintillators such as the FIDLER CsI scintillator detector 
will be used to determine the extent of ground contamination.  CAMs are a long-term solution to 
area monitoring. Liquid scintillation detectors are required to test water contamination.  Like the 
studies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, long-term human studies involving bioassays, personal 
dosimetry, and whole-body counting will be performed.  The irradiation of the earth by nuclear 
detonation will form unknown concentrations of some long-lived radionuclides.  Gamma 
spectroscopy can be used to determine the mix of radionuclides present.  Isotopes likely to be 
detected are 90Sr, 131I, and 137Cs.  Strontium-90 is a pure beta emitter, but its progeny, 90Y, will 
have some accompanying gammas.   
 
In summary, measurements required would include: 
 Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix) – gamma spectrometry 
 Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems 
 Localized exposure rate measurements – Handheld survey instruments 
 Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or 
portal monitors 
 Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments 
 
3.8.2. Nuclear Reactor Incident or Event Involving Significant Release 
The second type is a Nuclear Power Plant Accident.  Major release from a commercial nuclear 




within regulatory limits as part of normal operations.  Spent nuclear fuel release is included in 
this category.  An accident or attack on a power plant could result in the spread of nuclear 
material over a populated area.  Whether accidental or malevolent, this is the second-worst type 
of dispersal scenario.  Monitoring would mirror that of a DNE and include aerial, vehicle, 
ground, and decontamination surveys.  Due to the long-term fallout of a nuclear accident, portal 
monitors may be warranted as well.  Fissile products from DNEs are expected as well. 
 
In summary, measurements required would include: 
 Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix) – gamma spectrometry 
 Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems 
 Localized exposure rate measurements – Handheld survey instruments 
 Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or 
portal monitors 
 Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments 
 Air sampling  
 
3.8.3. Beta/Gamma Radiation Dispersal Device or Transportation Accident 
The next type is a beta/gamma radiation dispersal device (RDD).  An RDD, also known as a 
dirty bomb, is a mix of a chemical explosive such as dynamite and radioactive powders or pellets 
such as the beta-emitting isotope 90Sr.  The detonation of the chemical explosive carries the 
radioactive material over an area.  The radioactive material does not undergo nuclear fission or 
fusion.  Unlike a DNE or nuclear accident, there is no nuclear reaction in an RDD.  Radiation 




explosive-based but can be dispersed mechanically or aerosolized.  An encounter with this type 
of RDD is the most probable because the radioactive material is plentiful and easily obtained; 
however, it is also the easiest to detect.  Sr-90 makes an effective RDD because of its long half-
life, high specific activity, and it is easy to shield until it is time to use.  The fallout of a 90Sr 
RDD is limited to areas of contamination because of this.  Sr-90 can be found in radioisotope 
thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and spent fuel rods.  RTGs are placed in remote locations with 
little or no manned security.  Fission products’ detection is not necessary, but instrumentation 
needs are the same.  
 
A transportation accident would fall into one of the categories above.  Documentation, labels, 
and placards identifying radioactive material must accompany radioactive material shipments.  
Multiple sources of documentation of the isotope being transported are available onsite and with 
the dispatcher.  Identifying the nuclide usually is not the concern but instead determining the 
extent of the contamination.  If a vehicle were transporting multiple sources of different types, 
then identifying a located source would be more critical.  GM tubes, scintillators, and handheld 
probes are enough for most traffic accidents.  Accidents involving larger vehicles such as trains, 
planes, ships, and vehicles on fire require large-scale monitoring to determine the extent of the 
contamination.  Handheld detectors must also account for alpha, beta, and neutron sources.  
There is a possibility the source may become aerosolized in a transportation accident, much like 
an RDD. 
 
In this case, the situation is treated as an RDD of a known isotope.  Air sampling is required for 




Adherence to ERPGs and other protective action guidelines (PAGs) is expected.  Emergency 
responders use electronic personal dosimeters (EPDs) to detect beta and gamma exposures and 
neutron exposures on specific models.   Beta/gamma EPDs utilize either a GM tube, NaI, or CsI 
scintillator, and neutron EPDs use a 3H or LiI detector.  Passive personal dosimeters can be used 
but provide no feedback when an exposure limit has been exceeded.  Passive personal dosimeters 
such as thermoluminescent devices (TLDs), optically stimulated luminescence dosimeters and 
infrared stimulated luminescence (IRSL) dosimeters can be used in tandem with EPDs.   
 
In summary, measurements required would include: 
 Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix) – gamma spectrometry 
 Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems 
 Localized exposure rate measurements – Handheld survey instruments 
 Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or 
portal monitors 
 Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments 
 Air sampling  
 
3.8.4. Alpha Radiation Dispersal Devise (α-RDD), Broken Arrow, or Failed Improvised 
Nuclear Device (IND) 
The next type is an alpha radiation dispersal device (α-RDD), Broken Arrow, or Failed 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND).   An α-RDD contains plutonium.  Broken Arrow is the code 
name of accidents involving a nuclear weapon outside the context of deterrence.  Broken Arrow 




is a failed IND.  A failed IND behaves much like an RDD.  Alpha emitters such as 239Pu and  
241Am have weakly emitting gamma as well.  Gamma detection devices, as in the previous 
examples, could also be employed here.  The situation would require the same instrumentation as 
a beta/gamma RDD, and alpha detectors would also be required.  Portable handheld ZnS 
scintillation alpha detectors can detect surface contamination.  Portable gamma spectroscopy 
utilizing HPGe detectors and alpha spectroscopy can identify fissile isotopes.    Unfortunately, 
alpha spectroscopy is limited in portability.  Ion-implanted silicon charged-particle detectors 
require a vacuum to count alpha effectively, increasing the device’s size and weight.  Liquid 
scintillation for alpha spectroscopy devices are also quite large and requires lab-like precision 
when creating aliquots.  RIIDs are ineffective due to their inability to detect alpha and low-level 
gamma.   
 
In summary, measurements required would include: 
 Isotopic identification (Radiological Mix – age determination) – gamma spectrometry 
 Large scale monitoring/mapping – air and vehicle born survey systems 
 Contamination surveys of equipment/people – Handheld contamination instruments or 
portal monitors (alpha) 
 Ground deposition – Handheld survey instruments, FIDLERs 






3.9. ADM-300 Platform 
The ADM-300 Multifunction Survey meter contains a high and low-range gamma Geiger-
Mueller (GM) detector.  The small portable case houses the GM, microprocessors, and display.  
Various function buttons are located on the top of the unit in Fig 3. The stated range of the GM is 
between 60 keV and 3 MeV.  It weighs about 1.17 kg and is 4.8 x 11.1 x 21.6 cm3 in size 
(Southern Scientific Ltd., 2021).  Opposite the display is an RS-232 serial communications port 
and a port to connect to optional external probes to detect alpha, beta, gamma, or neutron 
radiation.  Two nine-volt batteries provide 100 hours of continuous operation.   
 
 
Fig. 3: ADM-300 Base Unit 




Table 4 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and 





Table 4: ADM-300 Specifications and Scoring 
(Southern Scientific Ltd., 2021) 
 
Specification ADM-300 Utility 




















Alarm Y 1 
Battery indicator Y 1 
Battery life 100 hr 40 
Dimensions 4.8 x 11.1 x 21.6 cm3 8.69 
Humidity 0-95% 9.5 
Interference: EMF Pass 1 
Interference: Ionizing Pass 1 
Ingress Protection IP44 4 
Mechanical: shock Pass 1 
Mechanical: vibration Pass 1 
Power 9V Batteries 9 
Power-on self-test Y 1 
Pressure 4572 m (15 000 ft) 4.57 
Readout LCD 1 
Temperature: range -30 °C to +50 °C 8 
Temperature: shock Pass 1 
Units (SI, CGS) CGS 0 















 Accuracy ±15% 0.85 
Efficiency (4π) 1% 0.1 
Energy Response 80 keV - 3 MeV 3.6 
Dose Rate Range 0.1 μSv/h - 100 μSv/h 20.72 
Response Time 2 to 5s 0.35 
Sensitivity - - 















Connectivity: Bluetooth N 0 
Connectivity: Cellular N 0 
Connectivity: Print N 0 
Connectivity: RF/Other N 0 
Connectivity: Satellite N 0 
Connectivity: WIFI N 0 
Connectivity: Wired Y 1 
Data Analysis: conversion N 0 
Data Analysis: dose-limits N 0 
Data Analysis: error N 0 
Data Analysis: integrate Y 1 
Data Analysis: isotope ID N 0 
Expert/Advanced Mode N 0 
GPS N 0 
Graphical User Interface N 0 
Internal Clock: date & time N 0 
Internal Memory Y 1 
Removable Flash Memory N 0 








Calibration 1 1 
Consolidation Factor 4 4 
Consumables Required Batteries, Button Source 2 
Decontamination Method 0 0 
Durability Pass 1 
Ease of Use 2 2 
End of Life 2010 -5.5 
Initial Cost 8,192.41 2.44 
Maintenance Cost 245.7723 4.07 
Serviceability 0 0 
Shelf Life >5 years 5 
Tamper Resistance 0 0 
Training Cost $4,000  4 
Training Time 20 hrs 5 






3.10. Colibri Platform 
The Colibri survey meter is a comprehensive health physics instrument with unique 
characteristics that is by far the “smartest” survey meter of this analysis.  The device is a 
handheld G-M detector for measuring gamma, which features a suite of optionally connectable 
probes.  It features a color screen with built-in analysis software and wireless and GPS 
capability.  The Colibri platform consists of the Colibri-TTC and Colibri-VLD and a suite of 
inter-compatible probes.  The probes are compatible with the Multirad-LLR and Radiagem 2000.  
Measurements can be converted to SI and non-SI units in real-time and converted to visual 
indicators such as graphs.  The device can save data for later retrieval and is ruggedized.  During 
scoring, the Colibri-VLD scored nearly identically to the Colibri-TTC.  The Colibri-VLD 
contains CsI(Tl) scintillation detector and can detect a lower dose range than the Colibri-TTC. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Colibri-TTC and Colibri-VLD 







Table 5 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and 
Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical for the Colibri-TTC.  
 
Table 5: Colibri Specifications and Scoring 
(Mirion Technologies, 2015) 
  
Specification Colibri-TTC Utility 




















Alarm Y 1 
Battery indicator Y 1 
Battery life 25 hr 10 
Dimensions 19.5 x 10.0 x 6.9 cm3 7.43 
Humidity 10-95% 8.5 
Interference: EMF Pass 1 
Interference: Ionizing Pass 1 
Ingress Protection IP67 7 
Mechanical: shock Pass 1 
Mechanical: vibration Pass 1 
Power Rechargeable Li-ion 3 
Power-on self-test Y 1 
Pressure - 0 
Readout LCD 1 
Temperature: range -20 °C to +50 °C 7 
Temperature: shock Pass 1 
Units (SI, CGS) SI 10 















 Accuracy ±10% 0.9 
Efficiency (4π) 1% 0.01 
Energy Response 48 keV to 1.5 MeV 3.44 
Dose Rate Range 0.05 μSv/h to 10 Sv/h 19.11 
Response Time - - 
Sensitivity 9.79 Bq 0.1 















Connectivity: Bluetooth Y 2 
Connectivity: Cellular N 0 
Connectivity: Print N 0 
Connectivity: RF/Other Y 1 
Connectivity: Satellite N 0 
Connectivity: WIFI N 0 
Connectivity: Wired Y 1 
Data Analysis: conversion Y 1 
Data Analysis: dose-limits Y 1 
Data Analysis: error N 0 
Data Analysis: integrate Y 1 
Data Analysis: isotope ID N 0 
Expert/Advanced Mode Y 1 
GPS Y 1 
Graphical User Interface Y 3 
Internal Clock: date & time Y 1 
Internal Memory Y 1 
Removable Flash Memory N 0 








Calibration 1 1 
Consolidation Factor 4 4 
Consumables Required Button Source 1 
Decontamination Method 1 1 
Durability Pass 1 
Ease of Use 5 5 
End of Life 2034 6.5 
Initial Cost 7,674.00 2.61 
Maintenance Cost 230.22 4.34 
Serviceability 0 0 
Shelf Life >5 years 5 
Tamper Resistance 1 1 
Training Cost $4,000  4 
Training Time 20 hrs 5 






3.11. MULTIRAD-LLR Platform 
The MULTIRAD-LLR is a handheld G-M detector for measuring gammas.  The Multirad-LLR 
is compatible with probes used with the Colibri and Radiagem 2000 platforms, which expand its 
capability to detect alpha, beta, and neutron radiation.  The device has a simple LCD backlit 
screen and displays measurements in SI.  The device is rugged and uses conventional disposable 
batteries.   
 
 





Table 6 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and 







Table 6: MULTIRAD-LLR Specifications and Scoring 
(Mirion Technologies) 
  
Specification MULTIRAD-LLR Utility 




















Alarm Y 1 
Battery indicator Y 1 
Battery life 48 hr. 19.2 
Dimensions 17.1 x 9.1 x 4.5 cm3 14.28 
Humidity 1 10 
Interference: EMF Pass 1 
Interference: Ionizing Pass 1 
Ingress Protection IP65 5 
Mechanical: shock Pass 1 
Mechanical: vibration Pass 1 
Power 4 AA 1.5 V batteries 9 
Power-on self-test Y 1 
Pressure   0 
Readout LCD 1 
Temperature: range -25°C t +60°C 8.5 
Temperature: shock Pass 1 
Units (SI, CGS) SI 10 















 Accuracy ±10% 0.8 
Efficiency (4π) 1% 0.01 
Energy Response 50 keV to >3 MeV 4.09 
Dose Rate Range 0.1 μSv to 10 Sv 20.72 
Response Time 0.25 s 4 
Sensitivity - - 















Connectivity: Bluetooth N 0 
Connectivity: Cellular N 0 
Connectivity: Print N 0 
Connectivity: RF/Other N 0 
Connectivity: Satellite N 0 
Connectivity: WIFI N 0 
Connectivity: Wired Y 1 
Data Analysis: conversion N 0 
Data Analysis: dose-limits N 0 
Data Analysis: error N 0 
Data Analysis: integrate N 1 
Data Analysis: isotope ID N 0 
Expert/Advanced Mode N 0 
GPS Y 1 
Graphical User Interface N 0 
Internal Clock: date & time N 0 
Internal Memory Y 1 
Removable Flash Memory N 0 








Calibration 1 1 
Consolidation Factor 4 4 
Consumables Required Batteries, Button Source 2 
Decontamination Method 1 1 
Durability Pass 1 
Ease of Use 2 2 
End of Life 2022 0.5 
Initial Cost 5,254.00 3.81 
Maintenance Cost 157.62 6.34 
Serviceability 0 0 
Shelf Life >5 years 5 
Tamper Resistance 0 0 
Training Cost $4,000  4 
Training Time 20 hrs. 5 






3.12. Radiagem 2000 Platform 
The Radiagem 2000 survey meter contains a G-M detector for detecting gamma.  It is compatible 
with many of the identical probes as the Colibri and Multirad-LLR platforms, extending its 
capability to detect alpha, beta, neutron, and other gamma ranges.  The device has a simple LCD 
screen with a backlight.  Units are displayed in SI with a corresponding bar graph, and 
measurements can be saved for later retrieval.  The device is ruggedized and lightweight.   
 
 
Fig. 6: Radiagem 2000 





Table 7 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and 






Table 7: Radiagem 2000 Specifications and Scoring 
(Mirion Technologies, 2010) 
  
Specification Radiagem 2000 Utility 




















Alarm Y 1 
Battery indicator Y 1 
Battery life 80 hr. 32 
Dimensions 15 x 8.5 x 4.5 cm3 17.43 
Humidity 100% 10 
Interference: EMF Pass 1 
Interference: Ionizing Pass 1 
Ingress Protection IP67 7 
Mechanical: shock Pass 1 
Mechanical: vibration Pass 1 
Power 2 AA 1.5 V batteries 9 
Power-on self-test Y 1 
Pressure   0 
Readout LCD 1 
Temperature: range –10 °C to +50 °C 6 
Temperature: shock Pass 1 
Units (SI, CGS) SI 10 















 Accuracy ±15% 0.85 
Efficiency (4π) 1% 0.01 
Energy Response 40 keV to 1.5 MeV 3.62 
Dose Rate Range 0.01 μSv/h to 100 mSv/h 5.8 
Response Time 1 to 10 s 0.2 
Sensitivity 0.83 Bq 1.2 















Connectivity: Bluetooth N 0 
Connectivity: Cellular N 0 
Connectivity: Print N 0 
Connectivity: RF/Other N 0 
Connectivity: Satellite N 0 
Connectivity: WIFI N 0 
Connectivity: Wired Y 1 
Data Analysis: conversion N 0 
Data Analysis: dose-limits Y 1 
Data Analysis: error N 0 
Data Analysis: integrate Y 1 
Data Analysis: isotope ID N 0 
Expert/Advanced Mode Y 1 
GPS Y 1 
Graphical User Interface N 0 
Internal Clock: date & time N 0 
Internal Memory Y 1 
Removable Flash Memory N 0 








Calibration 1 1 
Consolidation Factor 4 4 
Consumables Required Batteries, Button Source 2 
Decontamination Method 1 1 
Durability Pass 1 
Ease of Use 4 4 
End of Life 2037 8 
Initial Cost 4,580.00 4.37 
Maintenance Cost 137.4 7.28 
Serviceability 0 0 
Shelf Life >5 years 5 
Tamper Resistance 1 1 
Training Cost $4,000  4 
Training Time 20 hrs. 5 






3.13. RDS-100P Platform 
The RDS-100P Radiation Detection System is unique in that the base unit does not contain a 
radiation detector.  The RDS-100P unit is the single-board upgrade of the AN/PDR-77 
radiacmeter.  The base unit houses the LCD screen, power, and system circuitry to operate a 
suite of probes to detect alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation.  The RDS-100P was 




Fig. 7: RDS-100P 





Table 8 scores the specifications for each of the categories of Instrument Limits and 






Table 8: RDS-100P Specifications and Scoring 
(Mirion Technologies, 2017) 
  
Specification RDS-100P Utility 




















Alarm Y 1 
Battery indicator Y 1 
Battery life 100 hr 40 
Dimensions 104 x 48 x 192 mm³ 10.43 
Humidity 0-95% 9.5 
Interference: EMF Pass 1 
Interference: Ionizing Pass 1 
Ingress Protection IP47 7 
Mechanical: shock Pass 1 
Mechanical: vibration Pass 1 
Power 9V Batteries 9 
Power-on self-test Y 1 
Pressure 4500 m (15 000 ft) 4.5 
Readout LCD 1 
Temperature: range -40° C to 50° C 9 
Temperature: shock Pass 1 
Units (SI, CGS) SI 10 















 Accuracy ±15% 0.85 
Efficiency (4π) 1% 0.01 
Energy Response 80 keV to 3 MeV 3.62 
Dose Rate Range 1 mSv/h to 99 MSv/hr 18.41 
Response Time - - 
Sensitivity - - 















Connectivity: Bluetooth N 0 
Connectivity: Cellular N 0 
Connectivity: Print N 0 
Connectivity: RF/Other N 0 
Connectivity: Satellite N 0 
Connectivity: WIFI N 0 
Connectivity: Wired Y 1 
Data Analysis: conversion Y 1 
Data Analysis: dose-limits Y 1 
Data Analysis: error N 0 
Data Analysis: integrate Y 1 
Data Analysis: isotope ID N 0 
Expert/Advanced Mode N 0 
GPS N 0 
Graphical User Interface N 0 
Internal Clock: date & time N 0 
Internal Memory N 0 
Removable Flash Memory N 0 








Calibration 1 1 
Consolidation Factor 4 4 
Consumables Required Batteries, Button Source 2 
Decontamination Method 1 1 
Durability Pass 1 
Ease of Use 3 3 
End of Life 2038 8.5 
Initial Cost 3,895.00 5.13 
Maintenance Cost 116.85 8.56 
Serviceability 1 1 
Shelf Life >5 years 5 
Tamper Resistance 0 0 
Training Cost $4,000  4 
Training Time 20 hrs 5 






3.14. Scenario Performance 
Each of the detectors above can operate in all the scenarios described above in section 3.8: 
Nuclear Emergency, Nuclear Power Accident, an RDD, an α-RDD, Transportation Accident, or 
assist in environmental measurements.  The detectors’ suite of compatible probes can detect each 
radiation type and provide dose rate information. A detector achieving 100% for each 
specification with the weighting specified represents the perfect detector.  The utilities are 
eventually summed, so the effect of each weight on the total was determined.  The importance of 
each weight can be considered holistically, as in a piechart.  Alternatively, the weightings can be 
expressed as percentages.  Under Instrument Limits and Specifications, most categories were 
weighted equally, except for battery life, size, weight, humidity, temperature, and units, which 
were assigned most of the importance. These exceptions were weighted more heavily and 
approximately equal because they were considered more important in this category.  Battery life, 
humidity, and temperature speak to the detector’s ability to operate in various environmental 
conditions.  Size, weight, and units enhance the operator’s ease of use in the field.  Accordingly, 
the weights were distributed to reflect their relative importance in the above scenarios.  For 
example, battery life is weighted by a factor of 40, yielding about 25% of the importance for 
Nuclear Emergency, Nuclear Power Accident, an RDD, an α-RDD, Transportation Accident, or 
assist in environmental measurements under the category of Instrument Limits and 
Specifications.  Similarly, the same rationale was used for the remaining categories.  Under 
Intrinsic Characteristics, Dose Rate Range and Energy Response were weighted heavily because 
a wide range limits the need for multiple detectors.  The other categories were weighted 
somewhat conservatively due to their relative importance or lack of consistent published data.  




time that is no longer experienced once the device is in operation; it is also not a primary driving 
consideration for selecting a detector.  Under Smart Features, each specification was weighted 
equally.  Under Logistical Category, Consolidation Factor, Ease of Use, Initial Cost, and 
Maintenance Cost were weighted more heavily and approximately equal to each other out of the 
remaining specifications.  See the appendix for specific weights.  Initial Cost can often offset 







The right-most columns of Tables 4 through 8 assigns a utility to the detectors.  The utilities 
from different requirements are weighted based on their relative importance and summed in the 
final row.  Weightings can have the same value among different lines, and utilities can have the 
same values within a line.  The highest-scoring detectors in the sum line are the most favorable.  
This section compares the sum of the utilities for each platform.  Probes are accounted for in the 
comparison.   In table 9, the utilities of tables 4 through 8 were summed.  The highest scoring 
platform is given 100%, and the others are scored relatively.   
 
 
Table 9: Platform vs. Cumulative Score in Each Category  






Instrument Limits and 
Specifications 
93.4% 78.4% 59.0% 100.0% 87.1% 
Intrinsic Characteristics 61.5% 74.9% 100.0% 85.7% 68.8% 
Smart Features 25.0% 100.0% 43.8% 31.3% 31.3% 
Logistical 53.7% 84.0% 97.0% 74.1% 100.0% 
 
 
The weight, small size, and battery life were the strong suits of the Radiagem 2000 and the 
weakness of the ADM-300.  The platforms performed comparably except for the Radiagem 
2000.  The dose rate range of the embedded G-M detector has the lowest range of the platforms.  
The Colibri platform has many smart features over the other platforms in no small part due to the 
embedded software, display, and telemetry.  The cost of purchasing and maintaining the RDS-
100P and Radiagem 2000 are the significant factors separating the platforms.  The Colibri 




following attributes are not differentiating factors among the candidates: Interference (EMF & 
Ionizing), Mechanical (Shock & Vibration), Connectivity (Cellular, Print, Satellite, WIFI, & 
Wired), Data Analysis (Error, Integrate, & Isotope ID), Removable Flash Memory, Calibration, 
Consolidation Factor, Durability, Shelf Life, Training Cost, Training Time, and Transportability.  






5. Findings  
Among the categories of Instrument Limits and Specifications, Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart 
Features, and Logistical, the overall ranking is as follows (1 is considered the best): 
1. Colibri-TTC 
2. Radiagem 2000 
3. MULTIRAD-LLR 
4. RDS-100P  
5. ADM-300 
Based on the goals of the organization, the categories of Instrument Limits and Specifications, 
Intrinsic Characteristics, Smart Features, and Logistical can be weighted differently to achieve a 
different overall ranking.  The above is unweighted and gives equal consideration to each 
category.  If, for example, costs are more important, then the Logistical category can be weighted 
more heavily, resulting in the RDS-100P ranking much higher.   
 
Not all information is readily available, and sometimes decisions must be made with incomplete 
information.  Some data is not available for comparison for every device.  This is especially 
problematic when summing utilities for comparison.  A literature search of comparable values is 
a good placeholder value but decreasing the attribute’s weight minimizes this effect.  For some 
highly weighted categories such as purchase price or dose rate range, the weight is not adjusted 
because it would bias the results towards less important attributes.   
 
The final recommendation based on this method is the Colibri platform for use in the scenarios in 




availability of smart features opens the benefits of increasing user efficiency and, with the 
internet, the potential to automate certain aspects of data collection, such as simultaneous real-







6. Analysis/Discussion  
Overall, the data suggests the ADM-300 should be replaced due to obsolescence factors.  The 
other platforms are lighter, smaller, smarter, and cheaper than the ADM-300.  The intrinsic 
capabilities of the ADM-300 to detect radiation are still competitive and speak to why it has 
lasted thus far.  
 
Each specification’s weighting is subjective to a degree, but there is apparent objectivity in this 
process also.  In sections 3.4 through 3.7, it is clear there is an objective ranking for each 
attribute; for example, a lighter product is better than a heavier one.  It doesn’t matter what 
number is assigned if their respective rankings remain the same, which is reasoning for 
normalizing each to one prior to weighting.  The more nebulous aspect of the process is 
comparing two attributes, for example, weight and size. Is weight more important than size? And 
if so, by how much?  These types of questions are left open to the user.  The user defines the 
importance of the attributes with respect to each other.  Refer to the Appendix for chosen 
weights.  Ideally, money would not factor into picking the best detector, but it is often the most 
important factor in any decision.  The conclusion given is very specific to the scenarios 
presented, and assuming different scenarios, perhaps a different detector would be 
recommended.  Furthermore, the long-term benefit over the life of the device was considered 
instead of the short-term.  This process assumes rational decision-making.  The inclusion of 
workplace politics can sometimes tend towards irrational or extreme prioritizing of certain 
attributes.   To limit sources of error in the process, gather as much data as possible to build 
robust matrices and understand organizational priorities to weigh the attributes appropriately.  




necessary information.  If some information is missing, then representative data from published 






7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Though not designed specifically for the military, the Colibri platform would make a suitable 
replacement for the ADM-300.  The Colibri performs similarly in detection ability but far 
outclasses the other platforms in data analysis and sharing ability.  The cost is a significant 







8. Future Work 
Monte Carlo (MC) modeling of the detectors provides more insight into each detector’s 
capabilities.  MC code provides energy response curves without the need to purchase the 
detector.  Several MC codes were considered.  The most established and widespread MC codes 
are Fluktuierende Kaskade (FLUKA), Geometry and Tracking (GEANT4), Monte Carlo N-
Particle extended (MCNPX/6), and Particle and Heavy Ion Transport Code System (PHITS).  
PHITS is preferred for student research for its ease and costs.   
 
The PHITS model of the energy response curve will differ slightly from the measured energy 
response curve, but from the model, the behavior of the detector can be predicted.  The energy 
dependence curve is given for the ADM-300 in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Energy Response Curve of the ADM-300 







The PHITS code and parameters were chosen to approximate the behavior of the ADM-300 
closely.  The modeled energy response of the ADM-300 is approximated in PHITS in Fig. 9.  
 
 





Further research is recommended in MC simulations.  Every combination of detector and probe 
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Table 10: Weightings Applied to Specifications 





















Battery indicator 1 
Battery life 40 
Dimensions 28 
Humidity 10 
Interference: EMF 1 
Interference: Ionizing 1 
Ingress Protection 8 
Mechanical: shock 1 
Mechanical: vibration 1 
Power 9 
Power-on self-test 1 
Pressure 5 
Readout 1 
Temperature: range 9 
Temperature: shock 1 


















Efficiency (4π) 0.3 
Energy Response 20 
Energy Resolution 0.1 
Dose Rate Range 20 
Response Time 4 
Sensitivity 2 















Connectivity: Bluetooth 1 
Connectivity: Cellular 1 
Connectivity: Print 1 
Connectivity: RF/Other 1 
Connectivity: Satellite 1 
Connectivity: WIFI 1 
Connectivity: Wired 1 
Data Analysis: conversion 1 
Data Analysis: dose-limits 1 
Data Analysis: error 1 
Data Analysis: integrate 1 
Data Analysis: isotope ID 1 
Data Analysis: Expert/Advanced Mode 1 
GPS 1 
Graphical User Interface 1 
Internal Clock: date & time 1 
Internal Memory 1 
Removable Flash Memory 1 









Consolidation Factor 4 
Consumables Required 2 
Decontamination Method 1 
Durability 1 
Ease of Use 5 
End of Life 9 
Initial Cost 5 
Maintenance Cost 9 
Serviceability 1 
Shelf Life 5 
Tamper Resistance 1 
Training Cost 4 
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